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PLEADING AND PRACTICE
PROCESS-NEw METHODS OF SERVICE

ADDITIONAL

methods of service of citation in the District
and County courts have been provided by Rule 106 as
amended in 1947. The rule now provides that where personal
service is impractical the court may upon motion authorize service
in three new ways. Upon proper authorization by the court the
citation may be left at the usual place of business of the defendant,
or at his home with someone over sixteen years of age, or it may
be served in any other manner authorized by the court which will
be reasonably effective to give notice.
That such provisions for substituted service meet the requirements of due process seems well settled.' Also it is clear that the
amendment has no effect upon the rule that personal service within
the state is an indispensable prerequisite to an in personam judgment against a non-resident of Texas.'

The only 1947 change made in the rule providing for service
of citation in the Justice Court is that in forcible entry and detainer
suits the serving officer instead of "reading" a copy of the citation,
shall "deliver" it to the defendant.' The rule still provides that
a copy of the citation may be left with a person over sixteen years
of age at the defendant's usual place of abode at least six days
before the return date. No motion or order is necessary to authorize this latter type of service in the Justice Court, whereas a motion
and order is necessary in the District and County courts under
Rule 106 as amended.
NOTICE

Rule 21a, adopted during the year, provides for an entirely
new method of giving notice in all cases where citation is not
1

Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457 (1940).
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
Rule 742, Tzx. Ruum Cv. Pno.
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necessary. This notice may be served on the party or his agent,
including the attorney of record, in person, by registered mail, or
by any other means considered adequate by the trial court in its
discretion.
Examples of possible applications of this new rule may be seen
in delivery to an adverse party or his attorney of copies of pleadings or motions as required by Rule 72; service of the contraverting plea under Rule 86; and notice, under Rule 200, of application to take oral deposition.
ORAL DEPOSITION

The method of obtaining a commission to take an oral deposition has been materially altered by an amendment to Rule 202.
Upon application for an oral deposition being made to the clerk
of the court, the clerk now immediately issues the commission.
Under the old rule the adverse party had to be first served with
notice and the clerk was not authorized to issue the commission
until ten days after such service. The new rule will shorten the
time necessary for taking oral depositions inasmuch as the notary
who will take the deposition may now issue a subpoena and
cause it to be served upon the witness while the ten days' notice
to the adverse party is running, rather than having to wait until
the expiration of that period.
JUDGE-DISQUALIFIED FOR RELATION TO WIFE OF LITIGANT

Mandatory provisions of the Texas Constitution disqualify a
judge from hearing a cause of action when he is related within
the third degree to a party litigant. The Supreme Court in Fry
v. Tucker" interpreted this provision to include relationship to the
wife of a party litigant although the wife was not named in the
petition and although the property involved was the separate
property of the husband, and where the only possible community
4

Tx. CoNsT., Art. V, §

S...Tex.

11.

, 202 S. W. (2) 218 (1947.
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liability was court costs. A dissenting opinion characterized the
majority holding as an unwarranted extension of the constitutional
provision in that court costs are not the subject matter of a suit
but merely incidents of a judgment.
The Supreme Court at one time indicated by dictum that the
word "person" in the constitutional provision would include only
persons named in the petition,6 but the trend has been to include
any interested person."
PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO A NON-SUIT

Rule 164 which grants to a plaintiff the right to take a non-suit
at any time prior to retirement of the jury,' was given a liberal
construction in Smith v. Columbian Carbon Co.' In this case the
plaintiff was allowed to take a non-suit after the trial judge had
announced to the parties in chambers that he had decided to grant
the defendant's motion for an instructed verdict. This case is in

accord with the liberal attitude which the Texas courts have long
taken in favor of the plaintiff's right to a non-suit.

°

SPECIAL ISSUES-DUTY TO SUBMIT SPECIAL INSTRUCTION
ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Rule 277 provides that a case may be submitted on special
issues raised by the pleadings and the evidence. It also provides
that the court shall submit:
a... such explanatory instructions and such definitions of legal terms
as shall be necessary to enable the jury to properly pass upon and render
a verdict on such issues, and in such instances the charge shall not be
subject to the objection that it is a general charge."

In construing this rule the Supreme Court held in Johnson v.
6 Jordan v. Moore, 65 Tex. 363 (1886).
1Seabrook v. First National Bk. of Port Lavaca, 171 S. W. 247 (Tex.Civ. App. 1914);
T&P Railway v.Elliott, 54 S. W. 410 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899).
8
Or,when tried by the Judge, at any time before the decision is announced.
* __ Tex. _, 198 S. W. (2d) 727 (1947).
10Kidd v. McCracken, 105 Tex. 383, 150 S.W. 885 (1912); Corder v. Corder, 189
S. W. (2d) 100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
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Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Co." that it is not
error to refuse to give an explanatory instruction on the use of
circumstantial evidence."
This decision overrules a Civil Appeals decision declaring that
a party relying on circumstantial evidence is entitled to a charge
thereon.'" The rationale of this rule is that a trial court should
be given broad discretion in determining what explanatory charges
should be given, and that usually refusal by a trial court to give
such a charge will not constitute reversible error.
SPECIAL ISSUES-WAIVER BY FAILURE TO REQUEST SUBMISSION

Rule 279 provides that if a party fails to request submission
of 'a special issue which constitutes an independent ground of
recovery or defense, such failure will be considered a waiver of
such ground of recovery or defense. In Clark v. National Life &
Accident Co." the defense of fraud in obtaining an insurance
policy was considered an independent ground of defense which,
since there was evidence both ways, was waived by failure of
defendant to request an issue thereon. This case illustrates the
importance of requesting an issue on an independent ground of
recovery or defense when there is any question whatever whether
the evidence raises a jury issue. Requesting such an issue does not
prejudice the right of the requesting party to later contend that
the issue was undisputed.'
Tex ........

205 S. W. (2d) 353 (1947).

12 Several cases, prior to the adoption of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941.
held that it is not reversible error for the trial court to include in its charge an instruction on circumstantial evidence. Brazos River Conserv. & Reclam. Dist. v. Harmon, 178

S. W. (2d) 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) ; Parr v. Gardner, 293 S. W. 859 (Tex. Civ. App.
1927) ; Rowley v. Braly, 286 S. W. 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
15 Hicks v. Frost, 195 S. W. (2d) 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), writ of error refused
n.r. e.
14 ...... Tex ....... 200 S. W. (2d) 820 (1947).
Is ". .. A claim that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the submission of any
issue my be made for the first time after verdict, regardless of whether the submission
of such issue was requested by the complaining party." Rule 279, Tex. Rules Civ. Pro.
(1940).
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JUDGMENTS-JUDGMENT RECOVERED AGAINST STATE UNDER
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE NOT VOID

If a court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter
of a cause of action, its judgment is not void and not subject to
collateral attack no matter how erroneous it may be.16 In Martin

v. Sheppard7 the Supreme Court applied this rule to a judgment
erroneously rendered against the State under a statute passed to
enable the widow of a deceased Highway Department employee
to bring suit for damages for her husband's death against the
State. The widow recovered a judgment but the Comptroller
refused to pay it. The widow then brought mandamus in Supreme
Court which held the enabling act unconstitutional.'" However,
since it was held that the unconstitutionality went only to the merits
of the cause of action and not to the court's jurisdiction"' the judgment against the State was sustained because it had not been set
aside in a direct proceeding for that purpose, the State having
failed to perfect its appeal in the time allowed by the rules.
JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC-WHEN TRIAL JUDGE

FAILS TO RENDER JUDGMENT
As a general rule a judgment nunc pro tunc will not be entered
unless a judgment has in fact been previously rendered by the
court. An exception to this rule is that a judgment may be both
rendered and entered nunc pro tunc where the failure to render
judgment within the proper time was caused solely by the court
itself and not by fault of the prevailing party." In Wright v. Longhorn Drilling Corp." the court applied this exception in holding

is 25 Tsx. Jup. 1 257.
1 .

Tex.......- 201S. W. (2d) 810 (1947).

1 The enabling act provided that the widow's suit against the State should be tried

according to the same rules of law, as to liability and defense, that would be applicable
if suit were against an ordinary corporation.
19 See Commonwealth of Mass. v. Davis, 140 Tex. 398,168 S. W. (2d) 216 (1942).
20 25 Tzx. Ju . 168; G. C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Canty, 115 Tex. 537, 285 S. W. 296
(Tex. Comm. App. 1926).
21202 S. W. (2d) 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), writ of error refused.
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that a judgment nunc pro tune would lie although the term of court
at which the case was tried had terminated without any judgment
being rendered.
TRESPASS TO TRY TITLE-EFFECT OF TAKE NOTHING JUDGMENT
WHERE TITLE Is SPECIALLY PLEADED

Since both title and right of possession are put in issue in an
action of trespass to try title, a "take nothing" judgment ordinarily
has the effect of divesting plaintiff of title and vesting title in the
defendant." However, the Supreme Court in Poth v. Roosth 2 refused to extend this rule to a case where in addition to the formal
allegations of trespass to try title required by statute, title was
specially pleaded.
The plaintiff, some time prior to filing this suit, had sued the
same defendant in trespass to try title as to the same land here in
question. The petition in the first suit had set out the formal allegations required by statute. In addition it contained further allegations that an oil and gas lease had been executed by the plaintiff
to the defendant and that it had expired and terminated by reason
of cessation of operations. The plaintiff accordingly prayed for
cancellation of the lease, but a "take nothing" judgment was
rendered against him. When the plaintiff filed the present action,
also in trespass to try title, and also alleging expiration of the
lease due to cessation of production and operations, the defendant
contended that he was the owner in fee simple of the land by virtue
of the "take nothing" judgment in the first case. The Court of Civil
Appeals sustained this contention" but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that because of the special pleading in the first
suit as to the execution of the lease and its termination, the subject
matter of the suit was only the title to the leasehold interest and
not.the fee, notwithstanding the formal trespass to try title allega22
Pemian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 73 S. W. (2d) 490, 107 S. W. (2d) 564
(1937).
Tex. .._, 202 S. W. (2d) 442 (1947).
28
26 Be S. W. (2d) 132 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
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tions in the petition. The Court said that the controversy in the first
suit was limited, as far as title and possesson were concerned, to
the question of whether the leasehold interest had been terminated.
Therefore, the only effect of the "take nothing" judgment was to
adjudicate in the defendant the 78 mineral leasehold estate under
the lease. Since, subsequent to judgment in the first suit, that
interest had lapsed due to abandonment, cancellation of the lease
was decreed and the plaintiff was restored to full title.
The holding limits the rule that a "take nothing" judgment vests
title in the defendant to cases in which the petition and the issues
go no further than the statutory allegations of trespass to try title.
Consequently, it would seem that in a case in which less than the
full fee simple is in controversy, a plaintiff may avoid the risk
that such a "take nothing" judgment will divest him of his entire
title, by adding appropriate special pleadings to the formal trespass to try title allegations."'
POWER OF TRIAL JUDGE TO EXTEND TERM AS TO SINGLE CASE

Article 1923 provides in part:
"Whenever a district court shall be in the midst of the trial of a cause
when the time for the expiration of the term of said court arrives, the
judge presiding shall have the power and may, if he deems it expedient,
extend26the term of said court until the conclusion of such pending
trial."

In DeMoss v. Briggs27 this article was construed to authorize an

extension which will hold the term open until all undisposed
motions are disposed of. The court distinguished this case from a
previous case28 in which the court attempted to extend the term at
a time when there were no undisposed of motions in the case,
which attempt was held void.
25

But see Henderson v. Hall, 174 S. W. (2d) 985 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), error refused

for want o/ merit.
26 TE.. VEaNON'S ANN. CLV. STAT. (1925) art.

1923.

,7 ... Tex ...... ,201 S. W. (2d) 40 (1947).
2 Wichita Falls Traction Co. v. Cook, 60 S. W. (2d) 764 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
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In each of these cases the trial court's extension order recited
that extension Was to a specified date. The cited cases establish
the important principle that such attempt is/void as to any period
subsequent to disposition of pending motions even though prior to
the date designated in the order. The attorney asking the extension
should be careful to have the record include at least one undisposed of motion, filed during the regular term. This situation is
to be distinguished from a general extension as to all cases, as
authorized by Article 200a."0 An order under this statute to be
valid must designate a specific date upon which the term as extended shall end."0
JURY MISCONDUCT

Prior to adoption of the new rules in 1941, proving misconduct
of the jury raised a presumption of injury sufficient to entitle the
complaining party to a new trial." Under Rule 327, however,
such misconduct, though proved, will not constitute reversible
error unless it appears that it probably resulted in injury to the
complaining party."
In Motley v. Mielsch8 the Supreme Court held, in accord with
the above rule, that after misconduct is proved as a fact by the
complaining party on hearing of motion for new trial, then the
question whether injury probably resulted is one of law in the
first instance for the trial court, and on appeal, for the reviewing
court. This was an OPA violation case. The alleged misconduct
of the jurors was in considering a statement made by one of their
number, during deliberations, that it was customary for secondhand auto dealers to charge more than ceiling prices for automo29

Tx.VERNON's ANN. CiV. STAT. (1925) art. 200a.

30 Hamilton v. Empire Gas &Fuel Co., 110 S. W. (2d) 561 (Tex. Comm. App. 1937).
s1 Plaster v. Roper, 152 S. W. (2d) 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), writ of error relused;
West Lumber Co. v. Tomme, 203 S. W. 784 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918), writ of error refused.
32 Rule 327 provides in part, "Where the ground of the motion is misconduct of the
jury ... the court... may grant a new trial ... if it reasonably appears ...that injury
probably resulted to the complaining party."

33 145 Tex. 557, 200 S. W. (2d) 622 (1947).

1948]
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biles. The Supreme Court, applying the rule just stated, found as
a matter of law that this misconduct probably resulted in injury.
Other cases have applied the same rule."' Still others however,
have seemingly overlooked the change effected by Rule 327.u
APPEAL AND ERROR-FINAL OR INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

Generally appeals will lie only from such interlocutory orders
as are specially made appealable by statute.36 An order overruling
a plea in abatement is an interlocutory order, and there is no
statute authorizing an appeal from such an order before final
judgment on the merits. An order granting a temporary injunction,
however, is expressly made appealable by statute. 7 In Witt v.
Witt"' it was held that a non-appealable interlocutory order overruling a plea in abatement could not be tacked onto an appealable
interlocutory order granting a temporary injunction, as a means
of obtaining review of the former along with the latter. It was
further held that it made no difference that both parties desired the
appellate court to determine the validity of the non-appealable
order, since appellate jurisdiction of interlocutory orders can not
be conferred by mere agreement of the parties.
APPEAL AND ERROR-RIGHT TO APPEAL FROM
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
9

In Tims v. Tims the defendant was adjudged in contempt of
court for failure to obey an order of the court in a prior divorce
action. The court conditionally assessed a fine and ordered him
committed to jail if he failed to comply with the previous order
within 30 days. In dismissing an attempted appeal from the contempt order the Court of Civil Appeals stated that the only manner
84 Barrington v. Duncan, 140 Tex. 510, 169 S. W. (2d) 412 (1943).
s5 Currie v. Smith, 184 S. W. (2d) 656 (Te.

Civ. App. 1945); Freeman v. Hilman,

173 S. W. (2d) (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
,5 3 Tsx. JuR. 125.
STEx. REV. Civ. STAT. (1925) art. 4662.
38 205 S. W. (2d) 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
39 204 S. W. (2d) 995 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), writ of error refsed.
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in which such a contempt proceeding and judgment thereon can be
reviewed is by means of habeas corpus. 4° As the defendant was
not in custody nor in any manner restrained of his liberty the case
was not an appeal from a judgment upon habeas corpus, but an
attempt to appeal directly from a contempt order, therefore the
court held that it did not have jurisdiction of the appeal.
APPEAL AND ERROR-POWER OF COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS TO
PASS ON SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

In Wilson v. Wilson4 ' the Supreme Court reiterated the rule

that while the Courts of Civil Appeals are invested with the power
to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment
of a trial court, their authority goes only to the right to reverse
the trial court's judgment-not to substitute their findings respecting the weight of the evidence for those of the trial court. In this
case a Court of Civil Appeals found that the findings of the trial
court (sitting without a jury) on certain issues were not supported
by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence, and therefore reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered judgment for

the appellant. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case
to the trial court for another trial. This ruling is, of course, limited
to situations where there is evidence on both sides and has no
application to a case in which the evidence is undisputed.
APPEAL AND ERROR-REVERSAL FOR FUNDAMENTAL ERROR

NOT ASSIGNED

Rule 374 states in part: "... A ground of error not distinctly
set forth in a motion for new trial . . . shall be considered as

waived." The Supreme Court in Ramsey v. Dunlop'" held that this
rule does not deprive appellate courts of power to pass on errors
0In 1942 in Harbison v. McMurray, 138 Tex. 192, 158 S. W. (2d) 284, the Supreme
Court laid down the rule that an appeal from a hearing upon a writ of habeas corpus
arising out of a contempt order in a civil proceeding should be classified as a civil case,
and that Courts of Civil Appeals have jurisdiction of such appeals.
41 145 Tex. 607,201 S. W. (2d) 226 (1947).
4. __ Tex.
, 205 S. W. (2d) 979 (1947).
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apparent upon the face of the record, even though unassigned, if
they are truly fundamental errors. The Court declined to give an
all-inclusive definition of fundamental error, but stated that for
the purpose of the case at hand it considered an error to be fundamental which "directly and adversely affects the interest of the
public generally, as that interest is declared in the statutes or
Constitution of this state," and cited the case of Texas & Pacific
Coal Co. v. Lawson"3 as illustrative of its meaning.
NEW TRIAL-NECESSITY OF ASSIGNING ERROR IN MOTION
In a later decision unassigned "fundamental" error was again
referred to. In Boyd v. Texas Employers Insurance Association"
after judgment for the defendant in the trial court, the plaintiff
filed a motion for new trial setting up jury misconduct. The trial
court overruled the motion. On appeal the plaintiff contended that
certain acts of the jurors, revealed by their testimony on hearing
of the motion for new trial, constituted fundamental error, therefore they were not to be considered as waived even though those
specific acts were not assigned as error in such motion for new
trial. The Court of Civil Appeals held, however, that such matters did not constitute fundamental error, not being apparent from
the record but being 4ascertainable
only from an examination of
5
the statement of facts.

POWER OF COURT TO EXTEND TIME FOR REHEARING

Rule 458 provides that a motion for rehearing must be filed
within 15 days after rendition of judgment, or that a request for
an enlargement of the time for filing such motion must be made
4s 89 Tex. 394, 32 S. W. 871 (1895). The action in that case was to collect rents
allegedly due under a written lease contract. The only defense was that under correct
statement of accounts the defendant owed no rents, but was owed large sums by the
plaintiff. It was apparent from the petition that the contract violated the atni-trust
statutes. Though the question of illegality of the contract was not assigned as error on
the appeal, the Supreme Court itself raised the point and reversed on that ground.
4"207 S. W. (2d) 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), writ of error refused.
"The
5
opinion stated that any other rule would "disrupt the orderly disposition of
eases in the trial courts since the party seeking a new trial could allege some specific act
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within that period. In Reynolds v. Dallas County" the Supreme
Court held that if such motion is not filed nor request for enlargement made, within the 15-day period, Courts of Civil Appeals have
no authority to extend the time limit." In reaching this decision
the court stated that Rule 5 must be construed in connection with
Rule 458. Rule 5 states in part that a court "may not enlarge the
period for taking any action under the rules relating to new trials
or motion for rehearing except as stated in the rules relating thereto.. ." It was considered that this clear language deprives the
courts of any discretion in the matter even though good cause for
failure to file within the proper time limit is shown.
A.T.

of misconduct on the part of the jury and then, upon a hearing thereon, would he given
unlimited latitude to explore into all that the jury had said or done in their retirement
in the hope of developing something that could be seized upon as a bads for an assign,
ment of fundamental error." 207 S. W. (2d) 709, 712.
46 __ Te. .-, 207 S. W. (2d) 362 (1947).
41 Previously In Teal v. State, 191 S. W. (2d) 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1945) the Court
of Criminal Appeals, after holding that the time for filing a motion for rehearing in that

court is governed by the rules as applied in civil cases, indicated that Rule 458 might be
disregarded for exceptional reasons when the party seeking a rehearing isnot to blame
for the delay.
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VENUE

T

HERE were, no doubt, more 1947 cases on venue than on any
other subject. As there is no appeal from a court of civil
appeals decision on a plea of privilege, except by the indirect
method of certified questions, there was, as in the past, some
confusion.
Proving Venue Facts
By way of refresher, the filing of a plea of privilege is prima
facie proof of a defendant's right to change of venue.' The plain.
tiff must then file a controverting plea showing specifically that the
case is within the particular subdivision of Article 1995' relied
on to give venue, although it need not be mentioned by number.'
Thereafter the plaintiff must prove his venue facts, which are the
provisions in each subdivision which constitute exceptions to a defendant's right to be sued in his home county.
Many cases prior to Compton v. Elliote held that the plaintiff
need make only prima facie proof of the venue facts,6 and there
are still remnants of those decisions in 1947,' but it is now fairly
well established that the venue facts must be proved like the allegations of any plea. 8
The difficulty has been in ascertaining what venue facts each
I2 Texas Louisiana Power

Co. v. Wells, 121 Tex. 397, 48 S. W. (2d) 978 (1932).
(Vernon, 1925) art. 1995.
3 Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232,88 S. W. (2d) 91 (1935).
4 Walter v.Hammonds, 42 S. W. (2d) 1083 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
5 126 Tex. 232, 88 S. W. (2d) 91 (1935).
6 Austin Bros. v. Sill, 83 S. W. (2d) 716 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) ; Page v. Schlortt, 71
S. W. (2d) 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
7 Stripling v. Hoing, 203 S. W. (2d) 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).

TEx. REv. CIV.

STAT.

8Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232, 88 S. W. (2d) 91 (1935); Johnson v. Dallas
Cooperage & Woodenware Co., 120 Tex. 27,34 S. W. (2d) 845 (1931).
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subdivision requires and whether or not proof of a cause of action
is one of the venue facts.
Space will not permit a complete analysis of all the subdivisions
in relation to venue facts, but it would be well to state what some
of the 1947 cases held to be venue facts.
Herold v. Texas Venetian Blind Co.' held that the venue facts
necessary under subdivision 4, which provides for the joining of a
co-defendant in the county of another defendant, are: (a) allege
in the controverting plea, "a joint cause of action against the two
defendants or a cause of action against the resident defendant so
intimately connected with the cause of action alleged against the
non-resident defendant that the two may be joined under the rule
intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits,""0 (b) allege that the
resident defendant in fact resides in such county, and (c) prove
a cause of action against the resident defendant.
This seems to be in accordance with the more recent cases on
this subdivision.'
In Amarillo Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Inc. v. Loudder," the wife
of the plaintiff drank a Coca-Cola alleged to have had a mouse
in it. The court held that under subdivision 23, which provides,
in part, that suit against a private corporation, joint stock company, or association may be brought where the cause of action
arose, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove acts of negligence because makers of beverages operate under strict liability.
The court stated that the venue facts were: (a) allege and, prove
a cause of action, and (b) the cause of action must have arisen
in the county where suit was brought."
It is conceded that the two venue facts required by the principal
case are essential, but there is some confusion as to whether or

9 203 S.

W. (2d) 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).

10 Id. at 692.
1 Templeton v. Woolverton, 168 S. W. (2d) 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Lanham v.

Lanham, 175 S.W. (2d) 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) ; Cl: Crawford v.Sanger, 160 S. W.
(2d) 115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), (Each element of the cause of action as a venue fact.)
12207 S. W. (2d) 632 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
IsAccord: Select lav. Co. v. Cloud, 120S. W. (2d) 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).

VENUE

not there should be an additional venue fact that the defendant
was a corporation or association. A similar "mouse case" has so
held,"' but Rule 93 (g)S indicates such proof is not necessary
unless the fact that the defendant is a corporation is denied under
oath.
Another case under subdivision 23, Stripling v. Hoing,1s held
that only a prima facie cause of action need be shown. This was a
suit for conversion. Such a holding seems directly in conflict with
the well established rule that when the suit is brought in the
county where an alleged cause of action, or part thereof, arose,
plaintiff must allege and prove the cause of action."
The decision in the Stripling case was based on Farmer's Seed
& Gin Co. v. Brooks"8 which held in a suit under subdivision 23
based on a contract, that it was not necessary to show a breach
in the county where suit was brought, but only that the contract
was entered into there. This proceeds on the theory that a part
of the cause of action accrued where the contract was made. The
case has been followed in other suits based on contract. 19
It would seem that the Farmer's Seed case absolves a plaintiff
from proving that the breach of the contract arose where suit was
brought. The court still required proof of a cause of action and
that part of the cause of action, the making of the contract, arose
in the county where plaintiff. sued.
4 Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. Kubena, 90 S. W. (2d) 605 (Te.
1936).
15 Trx. RULES CIV. PROC. (1941) Rule 93(g).
1s 203 S. W. (2d) 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).

Civ. App.

17 That you must prove a cause of action subd. 9: Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232, 88
S. W. (2d) 91 (1935). Under subd. 23: Uvalde Const. Co. v. Shannon. 165 S. W. (2d)
512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Hill v. Uvalde Const. Co., 151 S. W. (2d) 283 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941). Under subd. 29: Blanton v. Garrett, 133 Tex. 399, 129 S. W. (2d) 623
(1939) ; A. H. Belo Corp. v. Blanton, 133 Tex. 391, 129 S. W. (2d) 619 (1939).
Is 125 Tex. 234, 81 S. W. (2d) 675 (1935).
19 Standard Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Miller, 114 S. W. (2d) 1201 (Tex. Civ. App.
1938) ; Grayson v. Cate, 95 S. W. (2d) 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), writ of error dism'd.;
De Garza v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 83 S. W. (2d) 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
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The principal case seems clearly contra to the more recent expressions of the Supreme Court.2°
The chief objection to requiring only a prima facie cause of
action is that it does not allow the defendant to controvert and thus
too quickly deprives him of the valuable right of defending on
his home soil.
An excellent illustration of the necessity of proving a cause of
action is Downs v. McCampbell.1 There, plaintiff, riding in defendant's automobile, brought an action under the Guest Statute,"
which states that there is no cause of action unless the operator
injured plaintiff intentionally or in heedless or reckless disregard
of the rights of others. The old cases"3 had not decided what
effect the Guest Statute has on subdivision 9. The old venue statute '
read: ". . where the foundation of the suit is some crime, or
offense, or trespass, for which a civil action in damages may
lie.. ." The present statute is practically the same except it omits
"for which a civil action in damages may lie." The court held that
the statutes must still be consulted to see whether damages would
lie. As the Guest Statute sets out the degree of negligence, a failure
to prove such a degree constitutes a failure to prove a cause of
action.
In Dillard v. Smith," a mandamus action to certify questions,
J. A. & E. D. Transport Co. were made defendants, and in the
body of the petition Coy and Edna Dillard were named as doing
business as the Company. The Court of Appeals had, held that
the plaintiff was not required to prove that Coy and Edna in fact
owned and operated the business. In answer to certified questions
the Supreme Court held that Coy and Edna are the only real
20 Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232, 88 S. W. (2d) 91 (1935) ; Victoria Bank & Trust
Co. v. Monteith, 138 Tex. 216,158 S.W. (2d) 63 (1941) ; and cases cited in note 17, supra.
21203 S. W. '2d) 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
22

Tu. REv. Cwr. STAT. (Vemon,'s 1925) Art. 6071b.

22 Mies Y.Sdtzer, 143 S. W. (2d) 973 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), writ ot error dism'.;
Hamilton v. Perry, 85 S. W. (2d) 846 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
2'Tzz. Rv. Ctv. STAT. (1914) art. 1830, aubd. 9.
Is Tex. ., 205 S. W. (2d) 366 (1947).
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defendants and that Rule 28" is purely procedural in allowing a
suit in the business name. The substantive rights are not changed;
therefore, under subdivision 9, the plaintiff must prove all essential elements of a trespass which includes a showing that the automobile marked "J. A. &E. D. Transport Co." was connected with
the defendants and that they owned and operated the business.
This appears in accord with the majority holding that proving a
cause of action is a venue fact under subdivision 9."
In Texas Plains Lodge No. 105 v. Cleglorne the plaintiff
Amarillo Lodge brought an action against the trustees of the railroad in the plaintiff's home county under subdivision 3, which provides that if one or all of several defendants reside without the
state or if their residence is unknown, suit may be brought where
the plaintiff resides. The suit was to establish union senority rights,
so the plaintiff joined as a defendant the Dalhart Lodge under
subdivision 29a providing for joinder of necessary parties. The
court held that under subdivision 3, a bona f/ide cause of action
must be alleged and that the plaintiff must then go further, under
subdivision 29a, and establish a cause of action of such a nature
that proper adjudication could not be had without the Dalhart
Lodge's presence.
In view of the cases since Union Bus Lines v. Byrd" it seems
well established that in order to be a necessary party under subdivision 29a there must be proved a cause of action against the
party sought to be joined. The greater porblem, however, is can
the plaintiff maintain venue under subdivision 3 when one of the
defendants is a resident of the state? The old venue statute s° stated
that if all the defendants resided without the state the plaintiff
could sue in his home county. Subdivision 3 now reads, "If one
or all of several defendants reside without the state.. .

."

Since

26 Tzx. RuLn Civ. Paoc. (1941) Rule 28.
2T Meredith v. McClendon, 130 TeL 527, 111 S. W. (2d) 1062 (1938); City of Mineral Wells v. McDonald, 141 Ta. 113, 170 S. W. (2d) 466 (1943).
22 207 S. W. (2d) 109 (Tex Civ. App. 1947).
29 142 Tez. 257, 177 S. W. (2d) 774 (1944).

so Tzx.Rzv. Crv. STAT. (1914) arL 1830, subd..&
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the change in the wording of the statute, it has been held that
regardless of the new wording the old rule still applied that a
defendant who was a resident of the state could not be deprived
of his privilege of being sued in his home county by first bringing
the action against a non-resident and joining the resident defendant." Of course, if this construction is correct, 29a would not be
applicable because it applies only when venue as to one or more
defendants can be maintained under some other subdivision.ss
There are some cases, however, in line with the principal case.
Domicile
It has been held that the words "domicile" and "residence" as
used in the venue statute are interchangeable words."' In Woodman
v. Bishop" the plaintiff controverted the plea of privilege under
subdivision 30, which provides that where there is a statute regulating the character of an action, suit may be brought where venue
is expressly given; and Article 5073w' providing that suits for
the recovery of usurious interest may be brought in the county
of the plaintiff's residence. The contract recited that the plantiff's
domicile was in Cook County, Illinois, but the court held that it is
the domicile in Texas which controls. This seems in accord with
the established rule" but is interesting because the contract recited
domicile. The court also relied on the cases holding that for purposes of venue a defendant may have two residences,"' and thus
applied the two domicile theory to plaintiffs.
s1 Thomason v. Sparkman, 55 S. W. (2d) 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Key v. Mineral
Wells Inv. Co., 96 S. V. (2d) 804 (Tex. Cit. App. 1936) ; U. S. Gas & Oil Co. v. Duffy,
8 S. W. (2d) 278 (Ta. Civ. App. 1928).
at Bender v. Armstrong, 88 S. W. (2d) 778 (Te. Civ. App. 1935) ; CI: Henderson
Grain Co. v. Rus, 122 Tex. 620, 64 S. W. (2d) 347 (1933), (Relied on in Bender v.
Armstrong, and includes a general statement that subd. 29a is used when plaintiff has
venue under another subdivision, but is not squarely on the point of whether all defendants must reside without the state.)
as Brown v. Boulden, 18 Te. 432 (1857).
"203 S. W. (2d) 977 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
art. 507.
3 Tr. Rev. Ctv. STAT. (Vernons, I5
STaylor v. Wilson, 99 Te. 651,93 S. W. 109 (1906); Pittsburg Water Heater Co. v.
Sullvan, 115 Tg. 417,282 S. W. (1926).
T7Pearsn v. West, 97 Tex. 238, 77 S. W. 944 (1904).
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Barnes v. Wese s was a suit to recover expenses for a surgical
operation performed on Barnes' wife. Mrs. Barnes had gone to
Jefferson County and unsucessfully prosecuted a suit for divorce.
Barnes followed from their home in Angelina County and after
physical encounter was asked to leave. The court sustained Barnes'
plea of privilege because under these facts Mrs. Barnes did not
have a separate domicile.
The case is in line with the well established rule that the husband has the right to select the domicile; however, it must be
with due regard to the wife's health and comfort."9 After the husband has selected the domicile, it is the domicile of the wife unless
he is guilty of abandonment ' or has consented that she reside elsewhere.'" The court apparently placed much weight on the fact
that Barnes was ordered to leave, thus negativing abandonment.
Such a case is to be distinguished from one where suit is brought
after divorce for necessaries purchased during marriage. There
it has been held that the wife has a separate domicile and the
husband may be joined."
An incidental point in Barnes v. West is that the opinion as
published refers to Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, Article
1995, subdivision 16. Subdivision 16 begins: "Suits for divorce."
The cited subdivision is not in the opinion on file at the Beaumont
Court of Appeals.
Adoption of Petition in Controverting Plea
The case of Fairv. Mayfield Feed & Grain Co."' brought out
the well established but frequently violated rule that the controverting plea must either repeat the allegations of the petition or
adopt the petition, if such allegations are to be considered in deter38 203 S. W.

(2d) 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).

39 Haymond v. Haymond, 74 Tex. 414, 12 S. W. 90 (1889).
40 Miller v. Stine, 99 S. W. (2d) 397 (TeL Civ. App. 1936).
41 Schulz v. L E. Whitham & Co., 119 Tex. 211, 27 S.W. (2d) 1093 (1930).
42 Tramnell v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 179 S. W. 271 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
4s 203 S. W. (2d) 801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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minin whether the plea alleges a cause of action.' In the principal case plaintiff adopted the petition by stating that it was, "made
and considered a part hereof for all pertinent purposes."" This is
not sufficient. The adoption must swear to the truth of the petition
so as to subject the affant to perjury if not true, and should not be
a prayer to the court to consider the petition and make it a part
thereof. The controverting plea must show the venue facts and if
adequate adoption is not made, it may be found wanting.
Effec of Failureto State a Cause o Action On Question Whether
PleadingOut of Order Waives a Plea of Privilege
In Atwell v. Talk" the Austin Court held that even though the
defendant answered to the merits including an aflirmative crossaction to remove a cloud on title, if the petition fails to state
a cause of action, such answer would not preclude the defendant
from later filing a plea of privilege. The court based this result
on the premise that a petition failing to state a cause of action is
a nullity. The court cited two cases" for the proposition that plead.
ing to the merits waives a plea of privilege, but they do not appear
to be authority for the holding that it waives only that part of the
petition stating a cause of action.
This seems contra to the well established rule that if the petition has the elements of a suit (a controversy and opposite parties)
it is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction and thus uphold a judgment
as against a collateral attack." It would seem that the petition,
the defect being that it did not contain an adequate description
of the land by metes and bounds as required by Rule 783,"' is
not a nullity and that the defendant should waive his plea of
privilege as to all the elements of the suit.
"4Jeffries v. Dunklln, 131 Te. 289,115 S. W. (2d) 391 (1938).
"5203 S. W. (2d) 801, 804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
46 202 S. W. (2d) 314 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
4"Martin v.Robinson, 67 Tex. 368,3 S. W. 550 (1887); McClintock v. Brown, 212
S. W. 540 (Te=. Cir. App. 1919).
4s Clayton Y.Hurt, 88 Tex. 595, 32 S. W. 876 (1696).
4"Trx.Rumus Cw. PNoc. (1941) Rule 783.
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Change of Ground of Venue in Controverting Plea
In Douglass v. Flintkote Co." plaintiff sued Davenport, a contractor who had allegedly misrepresented the qualities of Flintkote's roofing material, at his residence in Dallas County, and
joined Flintkote Co. as'a defendant, alleging that such concern
was doing business in Waco under an assumed name, with unknown owners. Plaintiff controverted the plea of privilege of
Flintkote with the allegations that Flintkote was a foreign corporation without right to do business in Texas and that as the cause
of action arose in Dallas County, venue properly lay under subdivision 27. The court held that the allegation that the defendant
was a foreign corporation appears for the first time in the plaintiff's controverting plea, and that a ground of venue in the plea
which is foreign to the cause of action in the petition, cannot be
availed of to defeat the plea of privilege.
It would seem to be true that the cause of action alleged in the
petition must control and that the venue issue must be confined to
matters common to both controverting plea and petition;1 however, it is submitted that both the factual interpretation and the
exposition of the law in Chief Justice Bond's dissent are to be
preferred. Chief Justice Bond asserts that the allegation that
Flintkote was doing business under an assumed name is not in
conflict with the allegation in the controverting plea that Flintkote
is a foreign corporation. As stated in Stockyards Nat. Bank v.
Maples, 2 the issue raised on a plea of privilege hearing is venue,
not liability.
Another point brought out by both the majority and dissenting
opinions in the case is that although plaintiff probably could have
joined Flintkote in the suit under subdivision 4, he did not rely
on that subdivision in his controverting plea and can not now avail
himself of it on appeal.
50207

S. W. (2d) 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947)1

51 Austin v. Grissom-Robertson Stores, 32 S. W. (2d) 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930),

writ of error dism'd.; Casebolt v. Waldron, 160 S. W. (2d) 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
52

127 Tex. 633,95 S. W. (2d) 1300 (1936).
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joinder of Parties Under Subdivision 4
Subdivision 4 of Article 1995 provides in part: "If two or more
defendants reside in different counties, suit may be brought in any
county where one of the defendants resides." There has been some
confusion as to the interpretation of this sentence. Fox v. Cone5"
held: "This subdivision applies only to where the cause of action
as to all the parties is the same." Then came another Commission
of Appeals case, Stockyards Nat. Bank v. Maples,5 which held
that under subdivision 4 it was only necessary to allege, "a joint
cause of action against the two defendants, or a cause of action
against the resident defendant so intimately connected with the
cause of action alleged against the non-resident defendant that
the two may be joined under the rule intending to avoid a multiplicity of suits." This is, of course, in addition to the venue facts
(a) that the defendant alleged to reside in the county where
suit is brought does so reside, (b) that a cause of action against
the resident defendant be alleged and, (c) that a cause of action
against the resident defendant be proved.
The 1947 case of Herold v. Texas Venetian Blind Co."5 followed
Stockyards Nat. Bank v. Maples. Here the defendant railroad
delivered a shipment to the defendant venetian blind company.
The plaintiff consignor brought the suit in the county of residence
of the railroad and the blind company's plea of privilege was
sustained. The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals held that it was
improperly sustained as the element of liability of the non-resident defendant is the lawful taking possession of the goods from
the railroad without payment of charges; hence, the delivery by
the railroad and possession of the blinds by the blind company
created a joint liability. It is to be noted that the railroad's liability was predicated on tort and the blind company's on contract.
The conflict between Fox v. Cone and Stockyards Nat. Bank v.
118 Tex. 212, 13 S. W. (2d) 65, 66 (1929).
"4127 Tex. 633, 95 S. W. (2d) 1300, 1302 (1936).
5 W3 S. W. (2d) 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).

33
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Maples is apparently decided by the principal case and a mandamus proceeding, Texas Venetian Blind Co. v. Bond,"' in favor
of the Maples case. In the denial of Writ of Mandamus to certify
the question, the Supreme Court said, "If it is sought to have
this court review and modify the rule stated in the Maples case,
that end can't be accomplished by a mandamus." The court then
said that the holding in the Herold case conformed to the Maples
case, the latest expression of the Supreme Court.
Maintenanceof Venue Where an Obligation
of a Written Contract Is Performable
There were three interesting cases in 1947 on the question of
where an obligation in a written contract is performable. Subdivison 5 provides that if a person has contracted in writing to perform an obligation in an expressly named county or a place
therein, suit may be brought in that county. Cunningham v. Allison5 7 was a suit in Tarrant County for breach of a contract to
sell maize F.O.B. Taft, Texas, all grain to be paid for at Ft.
Worth and, "any differences between buyer and seller to be adjusted at Ft. Worth, Texas." The court held, in accord with what
appears to be the majority," that it was immaterial that some obligations are required to be performed in a particular county; the
controlling question is whether or not the obligation upon which
suit is brought is required by the contract to be performed in a
particular county.
The phrase "adjust differences," the court held, referred to
differences over the amount of grain shipped. If the parties intended the phrase to confer venue it would be void to that extent.5"
As to the question of where an F.O.B. contract is performable,
56.

Tex.
, 205 S. W. (2d) 977, 978 (1947).
57 202 S. W. (2d) 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
58McKinney v. Moon, 173 S. W. (2d) 217 (Tex Civ. App. 1943) ; Williams v. Doering, 28 S. W. (2d) 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
59Ross-Carter Grain Co. v. H. H. Watson Co., 288 S. W. 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926);
International Travelers' Ass'n. v. Branum, 109 Tex. 543, 212 S. W. 630 (1919).
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the principal case was joined by Fair v. Mayfield" another 1947
case, in a holding that an F.O.B. contract does not make a prom.
ise to perform in the county of delivery. This question was confused until 1928 when the Supreme Court decided three cases
on the same day holding that venue lay in the county of delivery."'
These cases were followed until 1935 when subdivision 5 was
amended to necessitate that to maintain venue under subdivision
5, the parties must contract to perform an obligation in writing
and name the county or a definite place therein. Since then most
courts have held in accord with the Cunningham and Fair cases
that the place to be delivered does not in itself constitute a place
of performance of an obligation.62 The theory of the recent cases
seems to provide for protection of a defendant from being sued
outside of his home county on the mere recitation in the contract
of a place for delivery of merchandise.
Another case dealing with the problem of performance in a
particular county under subdivision 5 was Lawrence v. Continental
Fire & Casualty Ins. Corp." Continental sued in Dallas County

to recover premiums alleged to have been collected by Lawrence
as their San Antonio agent. The Agency contract read: "The agent
shall remit in full the balance... which remittance shall be made
in time to reach the home office of the company at Dallas, Texas,
not later than the last day of the second calendar month...""
The established rule, relied on by defendant, is that where pay.
ment by mail is authorized, performance is complete when a letter
containing the remittance, properly addressed, postage prepaid,
60 203 S. W. (2d) 801 (TeL Civ. App. 1947).
(%1
Marcus v. Armer, 117 Tex. 368, 5 S. W. (2d) 960 (1928); Berlowitz v. Standley,
I17 Tex. 362, 5 S. W. (2d) 963 (1928) ; Malone v. Dawson, 117 Tex. 377, 5 S. W. (2d)
965 (1928).
62-Southwestern Peanut Growers Assn. v. Kendrick, 183 S. W. (2d) 1019 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939), writ o/error dism'd.; Southern Pine Lumber Co. v. King, 130 S. W. (2d)
942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). Contra: Daugherty Grain Co. v. S. T. Oates Grain Co., 191
S. W. (2d) 804 (Tex. Civ. App.1945).
68 203 S. W. (2d) 967 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).

s4 d. at 6 .
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is deposited in the mail."' The court said the rule might well be
applicable if the contract had read, "The agent shall remit in full
the balance shown in the report..."," but that the fact it had to
reach the Home Office at a certain time, contemplated performance
in Dallas, where received.
Without finding any real fault with the construction adopted by
the court, it is well to point out the tack pursued by other courts
in construing whether a case comes within one of the exceptions
of Article 1995. It would seem ,that, "Shall be made in time to
reach the home office by..." could just as well apply to the
time of performance by mailing. The privilege to be sued in one's
county of residence is a valuable right and should not be taken
away on a doubtful construction."
Necessity of Active Negligence Under Subdivision 9
It is well established that "trespass" within subdivision 9 includes injuries to person or property resulting from wilfully
inflicted or affirmative, active negligence." Two 1947 cases involving the use of cyanide illustrate the difficulty in applying the rule.
In Baker v. Knight"9 the defendant used cyanide gas to fumigate
and the gas seeped through and killed some dogs of the plaintiff
veterinarian in the next compartment. In answer to the defendant's
contention that the negligence was passive and the cause of action,
if any, rested on the duty to warn, the court said that the use of
cyanide gas was highly dangerous, that the failure to warn only
tended to accentuate, and that the negligence was active.
In Waggoner's Estate v. Gleghorn,7' servants of the defendant
had planted cyanide cartridges to kill coyotes. The plaintiff, an
64 Postal Indemnity Co. v. Rutherford, 49 S.W. (2d) 1115 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).

6s203 S. W. (2d) 967, 969 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
6? Browne v. Heid Bros., Inc., 12 S. W. (2d) 587 (Tex.Civ. App. 1928) ; Southwstm

Surgical Supply Co. v. Scarborough, 15 S. W. (2d) 65 (Ter. Civ. App. 1929).

" Ricker v. Shoemaker, 81 Tex. 22, 16 S. W. 645 (1891) ; May* v.Smith, 95 S. W.

(2d) 1342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), writ of error disn'd.
69 205 S. W. (2d) 65 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).

TO 199 S. W. (2d) 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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invitee, was hunting and his dogs discharged the cartridges killing
five dogs and injuring plaintiff. The district court held that it was
an affirmative act of negligence and that the cause of action had
its beginning in the negligent act. The Court of Appeals, however,
said that defendant had a right to place the cartridges, but because
they were dangerous instrumentalities there existed a duty to
warn, which was not active negligence.
That there was active negligence in the Knight case doesn't
admit of much doubt, and that the Gleghorn case is distinguishable
on the facts is patent. An omission is not active and therefore
not a trespass under the venue statute."1 But a caveat might be
attached to the dictum in the G/eghorn case that if the planting
of the cyanide was considered active when done, it had become
passive by the time of the injury. There is a line of cases which
holds that it is not necessary that all acts of negligence be active,
but it is sufficient if the cause of action had its beginning in an
affirmative, active, negligent act. 72 The case appears to be much
safer placed on the ground that there was no orginal negligence
in planting the cartridges on defendant's property.
Commission of Trespass by Agent or Representative
Subdivision 9 until 1947 had stated that a suit based on a crime
or trespass could be brought in the county where committed. 1947
brought the addition ".... whether committed by the defendant or
by his agent or representative..."" At this writing there are no

cases construing this clause.
Courts construing the statute before the amendment had fairly
well established the rule that if an agent committed an affirmative
trespass while acting within the scope of employment, venue
T1 Autin Y. Cameron, 83 Tex. 351, 18 S.W. 437 (1892) ; Meredith v. McClendon, 130
Tex. 527, Ill S. W. (2d) 1062(1938).
T' Texas Hardwood Co. v. Moore, 235 S. W. 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Page v.
Schlortt 71 S. W. (2d) 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) ; Latta v.Bier, 281 S. W. 240 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1926); Dillingham v. Cavett, 91 S. W. (2d) 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), writ of
error3 di'd.
7 TEx. REv. CIw. STAT. (Vernon's S7p., 1948) art. 1996.
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could be maintained against the principal where the act was
committed; however, a group of cases had held that subdivision
9 applied only to the trespasser individually.7 '
If compelled to predict, it would seem that the result of the
amendment is to abolish the effect of a minority of cases which
hold that the defendant must be the actor to come within subdivision 9. It is doubted that it will make any change regarding
the necessity of a showing that the agent was acting within the
scope of his employment. It is submitted, however, that the clause
could be construed to make scope of employment defensive and
thus applicable only in the trial on the merits..
Two 1947 cases illustrate the conflict whether or not in automobile accidents under subdivision 9 involving an agent, there
is a presumption that the agent was acting within the scope of
employment. Poe Motor Co. v. Martin s held that scope of employment was a venue fact and must be proved; whereas, it was held
in Eilar v. Theobalh6 that a presumption arises, when agency is
shown, that the agent was acting within the scope of his employment."

The principal case holding that a presumption arises is
Broaddus v. Long,' a Supreme Court case of 1940; whereas the
principal case holding that scope of employment is a venue fact
to be proved is Brown Express, Inc. v. Arnold,"9 a Commission of
Appeals case, opinion adopted, of 1941. It is submitted, therefore,
that the holding in the Poe case that the scope of employment
74 Brown Express, Inc. v. Arnold, 138 Tex. 70, 157 S. W. (2d) 138 (1941);, Price v.
Schnaufer, 79 S. W. (2d) 872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) ; Murray v. Jones, 56 S. W. (2d) 276
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
15 201 S. W. (2d) 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
T0 201 S. W. (2d) 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
77 Holding must prove scope of employment: Brown Express, Inc. v. Arnold, 138 Tex.
70, 157 S. W. (2d) 138 (1941) ; Longhorn Drilling Corp. v. Padilla, 138 S. W. (2d) 164
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940). Holding is presumption: Broaddus v. Long, 135 Te. 353,138 S. W.
(2d) 1057 (1940) ; Boydston v. Jones, 177 S. W. (2d) 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) ; Weber
v. Reagan 91 S. W. (2d) 409 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), writ of error dism'd.
Is 135 Tex.-353,138 S. W. (2d) 1057 (1940).
T9 138 Tex. 70, 157 S. W. (2d) 138 (1941).
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must be proved is the accurate view because it follows the
most recent expression of the Supreme Court.
Trespass of an Independent Contractor of a Municipality
Akin to the question of scope of employment of an agent is the
problem of whether or not venue may be had in the county of
trespass against an independent contractor of a municipality,
without a showing of deviation by the independent contractor
from the contract. In Swilling v. Knigh80 the defendant contractor
piled debris in front of the plaintiff's garage while digging a
sewer for the City of Carthage. The court held that the plaintiff
had failed to establish a cause of action as the defendant was
using the method approved by the city. It is to be noted that the
plaintiff alleged the contract, that the cause of action arose out
of In
it, aand that the negligent acts were a result of the contract.
1948 case, Austin Road Co. v. Anderson"' (1948
cases are
not within the scope of this article, but one so much in point cannot
be overlooked) the defendant was also digging a sewer ditch,
in this case for the state, and blocked the plaintiff's "drive-in".
The petition mentioned that a contract was in existence, but it
was not in evidence, none of the specifications were alluded to,
and no effort was made to show that the work was or was not
done in accordance with the contract. The Supreme Court held in
answer to certified questions that no burden was on plaintiff to
prove noncompliance with the contract, and that the burden was
on defendant to show defensively that he had complied with the
contract.
The distinguishing factor in the two cases seems to be that in the
Swilling case plaintiff predicated his allegations of liability on
deviation from the contract, which fact would be necessary to
prove in a trial on the merits," but, according to the Austin Road
80205 S. W. (2d) 421 (Tex.Civ. App. 1947).
st ---Tex....,209 S. W. (2d) 595 (1948).
s2 Russell v. General Const. Co., 59 S. W. (2d) 1109 (Tex C.iv. App. 1933) ; Panhandle Const. Co. v. Shireman, 80 S. W. (2d) 461 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
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Co. case, is not necessary in the hearing on venue. The holding of
the Austin Road Co. case is that the plaintiff proves the trespass
and that whether defendant is liable is a matter of defense, but
in the Swilling case, the plaintiff's whole cause of action was
predicated on deviation from the contract.
Venue Under Subdivision 14
In McGrifl v. Hazle" the Eastland Court of Appeals held that
an action to set aside a quitclaim deed was not under subdivision
14, which reads, "Suits for the recovery of lands or damages
thereto, or to remove incumbrances upon the title to land, or to
quiet the title to land, or to prevent or stay waste on lands, must
be brought in the county in which the land, or a part thereof,
may lie."
The holding is in accord with the rule laid down in 1879 in
Lehmberg v. Biberstein" on the ground that the suit is essentially
an action to set aside a fraudulent deed. A suit to set aside a deed
is to be distinguished, however, from one to reform a deed, which
has been held as properly brought under subdivision 14.' It is
also to be distinguished from an action to cancel a deed of trust
which has been held to be proper under subdivision 14 as a suit
to remove a cloud on the title.86
In Sessions v. Gibsons7 the court held that when defendant cut
timber from plaintiff's land under a contract and didn't pay, it
was not a suit for damages to land under subdivision 14. The
court contrasted Grogan-Cochran Lumber Co. v. McWhorter"'
where the defendant had no legal right to cut timber, thus being
83

201 S. W. (2d) 92 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).

84 51 Tex. 457 (1879).
85 Nunnally v. Holt, 1 S. W. (2d) 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) ; Babno v. Compton,

230 S. W. 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921), (On ground it is an action to quiet title).
8
8 Moore v. Byars, 47 S. W. 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898) ; Pioneer Savings & Loan v.

Peck, 49 S. W. 160 (Tex.Civ. App. 1898), writ of error refused.
57 Kirberg v. Worrell, 44 S.W. (2d) 940 (Tex.Comm. App. 1932).
88 4 S.W. (2d) 995 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
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"'damages to land". This seems in line with the cases holding
that the damage contemplated by subdivision 14 is a trespass.8 9
Necessary Party Under Subdivision 29a
The Amarillo Court of Appeals held in Fairv. Mayfield Feed &
Grain Co."0 that because plaintiff knew the relationship of both
defendants to be that of agent and principal and no allegations
were made that either was a necessary party, that neither party
was necessary in a suit against the other.
Subdivision 2 9a reads:
"Whenever there are two or more defendants in any suit brought in
any county in this State and such suit is lawfully maintainable therein
under the provisions of Article 1995 as to any of such defendants, then
such suit may be maintained in such county against any and all necessary parties thereto."
The court stated that a necessary party is, "... one so vitally
interested in the matter that a valid judgment or decree cannot be
rendered without his presence as a party."
The definition of a necessary party has long been unsettled.
First Nat. Bank v. Pierce9 ' had defined a necessary party as, "...

only those persons without whose presence before the court no
adjudication of any of the subject matter involved in the litigation
can be had." But the Pierce case was expressly overruled, as construing "necessary party" in subdivision 29a too strictly, by Union
Bus Lines v. Byrd."2 The Byrd case said a defendant was a necessary party "...if the complete relief to which plaintiff is entitled
under the facts of the case against the defendant properly suable
in that county can be obtained only in a suit to which both
defendants are parties."
80 Fordyce Gravel Co. v. Springs, 79 S. W. (2d) 1111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) ; Houston
Lighting &Power Co. v.Jenkins, 5 S. W. (2d) 1030 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), (Holding that
when defendant has been granted an easement, it is an action in contract and not for
"damages to land.")
D0203 S.W. (2d) 801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).

91123 Tex. 186, 69 S.W. (2d) 756, 7 (1934).
92 142 Tex 257, 177 S. W. (2d) 774, 5 (1944).
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It is submitted that the result of Fairv. Mayfield Feed & Grain
Co. probably fits under the definition of Union Bus Lines v. Byrd,
but that the definition employed in Fairv. Mayfield is too narrow.
The same Amarillo court later held in Texas Plains Lodge No.
105 v. Cleghorn" that in a suit on a contract for seniority rights
by the plaintiff union against the trustees of the railroad, the Dalhart Union was a necessary party because Dalhart was enjoying
50% of the seniority rights. This case, without a definition of
necessary party being given, seems to come under the "complete
relief" definition of Union Bus Lines v. Byrd.

Venue in a Suit to Modify a Divorce Decree
In Harkness v. McQueen94 the plaintiff filed in Harris County
a suit denominated a motion for new trial to modify a divorce
decree in so far as it recited that there was no community property.
Plaintiff contended that the recitation was res adjudicata and
would prevent his bringing suit for partition. In controverting
the defendant's plea of privilege, the plaintiff relied on subdivision
30, which provides that when there is a statute regulating a particular action and the venue is expressly prescribed therein it will
control; and Rule 329(a), 9 5 which allows a motion for new trial
within two years when the defendant is cited by publication. The
court held that the power to partition in a divorce action is
special,9" and if the court doesn't partition the land an independent
suit may be brought.97 The plea of privilege was sustained as it
was not a motion for new trial but a separate suit asking for
partition; therefore, Rule 329(a) did not control venue.
The case seems clearly correct in its holding that the recitation
of no property was not res adjudicata,as Hardin v. Hardin," so
'i 207 S. W. (2d) 109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
94 207 S. W. (2d) 676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
95 T.x. Rmns Civ. PROC. (1941) Rule 329(a).
96 TEx. R-v. CiV. STAT. (Vernon's, 1925) art. 4638.

97 Kirberg v. Worrell, 44 S. W. (2d) 940 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932).
98 38 Tex. 617 (1873).
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holding, has been expressly overruled." As the ultimate purpose
was partition, which could be done by a separate suit, there was
no necessity for holding that Rule 329(a), in the light of these
facts, is a special venue statute.
Plea of Privilege to a Cross-Action
In Southern Medical & Hosp. Service v. Buie.Allen Hospital,'"
the plaintiff Hospital refiled suit in Falls County against the
Hospital Service Co. for fees on an insurance policy issued by the
defendant. Defendant's plea of privilege to McLennan County
was sustained and when the case was moved the defendant filed
a cross-action for malicious prosecution for refiling the suit in
Falls County when venue had previously been adjudicated as
being in McLennan County. Plaintiff then filed a plea of privilege
to be sued in Falls County. The court held that rule 97(g) 10 '
controlled. It reads:
"Tort shall not be the subject of set-off or counter-claim against a
contractual demand nor a contractual demand against tort unless it
arises out of or is incident to or is connected with same."

So, the court held, as the suit for malicious prosecution did
not arise out of the contract, the defendant (cross-plaintiff) had
to prove a cause of action under subdivision 9 arising in McLennan County, which was not done, so the plea of privilege was good.
This case is part of the problem of whether the venue of one
cause of action controls the venue of another. The first problem
is whether a plaintiff may join a cause of action which does not
have venue with one on which venue lies. For example, if plaintiff
has venue under subdivision 5, can he join an action on another
contract not under subdivision 5? The older rule was, in the
example given, that he could not join the two causes of action,'"s
99 Whetstone v. Coffey, 48 Tex. 269 (1877).
100204 S.

W. (2d) 996 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).

101T. RuLEs Civ. Paoc. (1941) Rule 97(g).
102 Altgelt v. Harris, 11 S. W. 857 (1889), (Not officially reported in Texas Reports);

lorioth v. McGraw, 37 S. W. (2d) 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
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but it is now reasonably well established that if the two causes
joinable, venue of one will confer venue
of action are properly
08
as to the other.'
Another proposition is that if a cross-action of a defendant
against a third party is distinct and severable it is an independent
suit and venue of the main suit does not control.'"
A third proposition is that illustrated by the principal case.
It would seem that Rule 97(g) would allow the venue of the
main suit to control unless the cross-action arises out of a different
transaction and sounds in tort against contract or contract against
tort. This was the rule before the new rules and Rule 97(g) seems
to demand that it be perpetuated. The insertion of Rule 97(g) by
amendment in 1941 has been criticised as not within the spirit of
avoiding a multiplicity of suits and as rehashing substantially the
same argument as has "arising out of the same transaction." '
It would seem better to allow a cross-action even if it arose out
of a different transaction and is tort against contract, or vice
versa. The separate trial provisions would avoid a multiplicity of
suits and remove the litigation of whether a counterclaim was
"incident," "connected with" or "arose out of."

J.H.H.

103 Sabens v. Smith, 118 S. W. (2d) 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Boyd v. San Antonio
Nat. Bank, 171 S. W. (2d) 375 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) ; Cl: Davis v. Peurifoy, 91 S. W.
(2d) 1175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), (Damages for wrongful issuance of an injunction, and
suit for debt and foreclosure of a chattel mortgage held not properly joinable.)
104 Union Bus Lines v. Byrd, 142 Tex. 257, 177 S. W. (2d) 774 (1944) ; Commercial
Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrow, 68 S.W. (2d) 540 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
05
Charles E. Clark, Tezas and FederalRules of Civil Procedure,20 Tax. L. Rav. 4
(1941).

